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The present work reviews how scholars of different disciplines have
examined political appointments in recent years, in particular, those
regarding public and semi-public organizations. First of all, I show
how political economy research has shed light on several reform pro-
cesses, arguing how economic and managerial policies have been im-
plemented also considering political rationales, such as, for instance,
the preservation of parties’ control of privatized firms. This endur-
ing power of political parties primarily results from their preserved
appointment authority over semi-public firms (beyond public agen-
cies), one of the tools by which the political class continues to govern
the enterprises in question. In particular, this appointment authority
has been exploited by parties in order to reward their members and
control bureaucracies, among other purposes. The phenomenon nat-
urally resulted in a widespread surviving politicization of the state,
which presents several consequences, especially in terms of public-
private politically connected firms’ performance. In the conclusions,
I suggest some further research trajectories which could enhance the
literature.




Established democracies, organized according to the principles of free
market and private property, still today present the state as a fundamental
actor competing in several key economic sectors. This state of play per-
sists even after the large state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) divestment strat-
egy which began during the 1980s. Indeed, governments, besides many public
agencies and semi-public bodies, continue to own large capital shares in many
operating firms, in fields such as gas and water supply, rail transport, airlines
and so forth.
Actually, Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) suggest that theoretically, un-
der conditions of perfect competition and without informational problems,
the question of ownership should not be relevant. Unfortunately, as a mat-
ter of fact, the above conditions are never met. The original arguments in
favor of public ownership were justified as a solution to the lack of compe-
tition and to the emergence of market failures, like externalities or natural
monopolies. Historically, SOEs were created also as direct instruments to
channel investments towards priority sectors, as perceived by the policymak-
ers, to implement full employment policies and promote balanced regional
development. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, the performance of SOEs came
under increasing inquiry due to inefficiency, mismanagement, corruption and
political interference. Privatization of SOEs has been viewed as a policy
instrument for minimizing the impact of political factors on economic per-
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formance, as pointed out by Vickers and Yarrow (1991), even though the real
outcome has not met these expectations.
Despite privatizations, the state most often preserved the majority of
shares of newly privatized firms or, alternatively, continued to control them
through special arrangements, such as golden shares, that leverage voting
powers. Importantly, this partial corporatization applied to the local level
as well. Indeed, the privatization wave has also affected sub-national levels
of government, so that public services provided by local or regional units
have been externalized, following the same corporatization reform approach
(Grossi and Reichard, 2008). Here again, full externalizations have been
uncommon, and even if local authorities lose the direct, and full, provision
of public services, they often maintained the control of new private-public
enterprises (PPEs) which provided the same goods and services. Scarpa and
Pellizzola (2009) call municipal capitalism the result of the described process
which shaped municipalities in a business-like manner.
The enduring role of the public sector in PPEs, as well as in public and
parastatal bodies in general, constitutes a valuable asset for governments
and, consequently, political actors. Indeed, most often parties are capable of
penetrating and controlling state resources, especially, using public and semi-
public firms for their advantage (Di Mascio, 2011) and not for the general
interest.1 One of the main signals of the parties’ control over the decision-
1Parties exploit state resources also in other ways. For some insights see Katz and Mair
(1995), Sundberg (2003) and Van Biezen (2004).
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making processes of public institutions and firms is the power of appointment,
which represents also a specific interest of the party (Daalder, 1966). By the
one hand, appointing a party member to a (semi) public entity’s personnel
(patronage) is a mean for obtaining a direct link to the firm/agency; by
the other hand, the nomination may be used in order to gain loyalty from
party members. Recent research on party democracy argues that parties
have begun to establish tight linkages to the state while functioning less
and less as voluntary associations for citizen representation (Bolleyer et al.,
2012). Therefore, patronage, intended as an incentive, may prove to be hugely
advantageous (Kopecky` and Scherlis, 2008).
Laver and Schofield (1998, p. 43) provided an idea of the entities which
are potentially influenced by patronage, other than newly privatized firms:
Probably the most important sphere of patronage, however,
can be found in the parastatal agencies, such as the many na-
tionalized industry boards; water, electricity, and other service
authorities; health boards; development authorities, and so on.
In Golden (2003, p. 202) words, the “political” jobs in question regard the
“parallel administration, a complex and probably unique melange of paras-
tatal bodies, public agencies and public corporations”. Recent research has
further placed emphasis on the importance of patronage also suggesting how
the political appointments practice differs within countries, both across pol-
icy sectors and within institutions at the senior, middle, and lower levels
of the hierarchy (Kopecky` et al., 2016). This to say that the phenomenon,
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although globally spread, presents different features according to countries,
sectors, legal systems and so forth.
The interconnection between political parties and public utilities should
not surprise. The party capture of the state has been analyzed from dif-
ferent points of view. A very recent trend in political science literature has
really focused on the allocation of jobs into the public or semi-public sec-
tor, highlighting the political parties’ discretion (Biezen and Kopecky`, 2014;
Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014b). In particular, the extension of the phenomenon
specifically regarding politicians’ appointments is well documented by, among
others, Boubakri et al. (2008). The authors confirm that governments not
only continue to remain a shareholder but also appoint politicians to key
positions in PPEs’ management.
Just to avoid any confusion, it should be reminded how patronage and
clientelism are considered different each other: “patronage typically pro-
vides party leaders with the means to build and maintain party organiza-
tions through the distribution of selective incentives to party supporters in
exchange for organizational (party) loyalty. Party clientelism, on the other
hand, is a form of representation based on the selective release of public
(material) resources contracts, housing, subsidies, pork-barrel legislation,
etc. in order to secure electoral support from individuals or selected sectors
of society”(Van Biezen and Kopecky`, 2007, p. 241).
After reviewing how patronage survived privatization, decentralization
and corporatization reforms, I will focus on the rationales of political ap-
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pointments. The logic of patronage, especially in Europe, is mainly guided
by the party leaders’ desire to control the implementation of PPEs’ poli-
cies and, in addition, by the opportunity to reward party members through
public appointments, as suggested by Kopecky` et al. (2012). The control
rationale is connected to the conflicting role of politicians and administra-
tive staff, which has been extensively debated by public administration and
public management scholars. Despite the politics-administration dichotomy
remains a formally accepted and frequently used model in many advanced
countries, where the public sector is supposed to be based on a sharp dis-
tinction between politicians and administrative staff functions, most often a
clear autonomy of the public management is far from being reached. About
the consequences of the lack of independence of public sector organizations
there is still debate.
The paper is articulated as follows. Section 2 presents how patronage has
survived the recent above mentioned reforms. Section 3 describes the princi-
pal purposes of political appointments. Section 4 outlines the politicization
of the public sphere and its consequences. Section 5 concludes.
2 A never-ending story
Stiglitz (1993) claims that one of the main disadvantages of privatizations
is the resulting loss of potential rents from the government. Moreover, the
author poses the question about how to privatize SOEs preventing the state
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from interfering in firms management, proposing to divide government inter-
ests among different executive units, simultaneously using check and balance
tools. In order to plainly understand the political distortions that could arise
from politically connected (public) firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) review
several kinds of potential interferences. Firstly, the enterprises in question
could sometimes produce goods desired by the political establishment rather
than by consumers, showing in this case how the provision of a (public) good
may have a symbolic value for a government party but no value to the citi-
zens. For example, a public bank could be asked to channel its loans towards
less efficient enterprises only because their political closeness to the govern-
ment party (Li and Yamada, 2015), neglecting socio-economic potentials.
Likewise, a politically connected public firm may be located in electorally
desirable rather than economically attractive regions, similarly to the case
when politicians allocate public funds to pivotal regions in order to achieve
electoral goals (Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).
Furthermore, some public enterprises may charge prices below the marginal
cost to increase their political masters’ electoral consent. In the model of
Shleifer and Vishny (1994) then, executives never desire to relinquish con-
trol over public or partially privatized firms. Lastly, they assume that most
publicly owned firms are encouraged by politicians seeking votes to employ
too many employees (Dinc and Gupta, 2011).2 This last kind of rent, for
2Since the adverse effects of privatization, such as layoffs, are likely to be concentrated
in the region where a firm operates, the governing party may lose votes in that region
because of the opposition from interest groups that are adversely affected, such as the
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the Argentine public provincial banks divesting process has been analyzed
by Clarke and Cull (2002). In their work, they show that labor market
conditions have affected privatization decisions about provincial banks. In-
deed, local governments of provinces characterized by overstaffed banks, high
shares of public employment, and high unemployment rates were less likely
to privatize. Theoretically, scholars have also proposed other possible ratio-
nales for the enduring government influence in PPEs, even after their partial
privatization. In the theoretical model of Perotti (1995), a limited divest-
ment may communicate the government’s commitment to market-oriented
policies. By relinquishing their control rights, executives signal that privati-
zation is credible and implies no policy risk (i.e., the risk of interference in the
operations of the firm either through regulation or re-nationalization). By re-
taining residual ownership, governments thus signal their willingness to share
any remaining policy risk. As a result, according to Perotti’s model, partial
privatization may be a political choice that depends on the characteristics of
the government in place, that is, on political institutions.
Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) empirically show that governments’ control
of privatized companies appears significant and hugely widespread around
the world. The authors report that many cases of privatization are char-
acterized by the sale of equity without a proportional transfer of control.
Basically, there are two types of mechanisms commonly used to achieve this
local employees of the firm. Privatization may also be perceived negatively by the public
as an inequitable transfer of publicly owned assets to private owners, which can result in
a loss of votes in the constituency.
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result. Firstly, governments can leverage the voting power associated with
their investment through pyramiding. With this ownership leveraging de-
vice, the state can remain the largest ultimate shareholder of a company
even though it no longer directly owns 100% of the stock. Secondly, govern-
ments may hold golden shares, which permit themselves to make important
decisions concerning the company, such as to veto proposed acquisitions, or
alternatively, to impose constraints on other investors, such as caps on their
share of voting rights. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) document governments’
overall control in privatized firms by evaluating both ultimate control3 and
golden shares.4 For the analysis, they construct a sample of 141 companies
from developed economies that were privatized (and became publicly traded)
prior to the end of 1996. Just considering ultimate government voting rights,
they find that the most common privatization outcome is that the state re-
mains the largest ultimate owner. Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) also show
that golden shares are particularly common among privatized companies in
which the government is not the largest shareholder: thus, through either
3The diction “ultimate” means that ownership leveraging devices are accounted for.
The authors remark how neglecting these mechanisms, they would substantially understate
the power of the state in privatized firms.
4In this line Italy may serve as an example: the Italian government launched its first
large-scale privatization program after the 1992 general elections, when the country was
facing one of the most acute economic and political crises of the post-war period. Since
1993, major privatization deals have raised more than US$ 100 billion, making Italy third
in total value of privatization worldwide. Despite this apparently remarkable result, the
Italian government is still an influential shareholder in many partially privatized firms.
For example, it holds direct and indirect stakes, also indirectly through Cassa Depositi e
Prestiti, in Eni (the largest oil and gas company), Enel (the electricity giant) and Finmec-
canica (the aerospace, defense, and IT group).
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direct ownership, leveraging devices or golden shares, governments preserve
the control of almost two-thirds of privatized firms.
The persisting role of governments, and thus parties, in partially priva-
tized firms, public agencies and semi-public companies in general, is func-
tional for the core issue I consider in this review, the opportunity to keep ap-
pointing politicians, activists and trustworthy people, to these entities’ man-
agement staff or workforce.5 This issue is particularly compelling whenever
nominations are made without considering merit and performance. Boubakri
et al. (2011) provide a fundamental work about the conditions that favor
residual state ownership in newly privatized firms. The purpose of their
study is to determine how political institutions influence post-privatization
control structure in a large set of emerging markets. They find that the state
remains the controlling owner (holds more than 50% of the shares) in 46%
of the sample firms. Boubakri et al. (2011) explicitly mention, among other
tools, political connections (30.3% of the sample firms), as a direct way of
controlling PPEs’ administration. They also assess how political constraints
and institutions influence the government’s residual ownership in the six
years following privatization. For instance, residual state ownership is higher
in parliamentary systems and under regimes with greater constraints on the
executive (checks). However, the ideology of the executive does not appear to
affect residual ownership. Consistent with extant arguments in the political
5For further information about the power of political parties over the appointments in
question see, e.g., Di Mascio (2011).
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economy literature (Alesina and Drazen, 1991), they find that when political
constraints and the power of veto players are higher, they limit the ability of
governments to put in place market-oriented reforms such as privatization.
Facing such constraints, the government is more likely to privatize slowly,
divesting small stakes in a sequence of sales over time. A similar result is
obtained by Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008).
Empirically, the number of political connections, in particular regarding
newly privatized firms, are well documented by Boubakri et al. (2008). In
their research the authors use a multinational sample of 245 privatized firms
headquartered in 27 developing and 14 developed countries over the period
1980 to 2002, trying to assess whether environmental, judicial and political
variables that vary across countries have an impact on the likelihood of ob-
serving political ties in newly privatized firms. Results show that 87 firms
have a politician or an ex-politician on their board of directors. Most of the
politically-connected firms are located in East and South Asia and Europe.
Only 12.64% of the sample of politically-connected firms is in Africa and
Middle East countries. Of the 30 firms operating in the energy sector in the
sample, 18 are politically-connected (i.e., 60%). The authors note that the
presence of politicians on the boards of such firms is most likely explained
by the importance of strategic sectors and their relative impact on the coun-
try’s whole economy: for instance, the presence of politicians on the boards
of petroleum companies ensures a relative stabilization of the market and
a quick reaction in times of crisis. Furthermore, strategic sectors are tra-
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ditionally state monopolies (especially utilities) and the transfer to private
ownership requires new regulations and extensive supervision. Thus, the ap-
pointment of politicians as directors keeps the firm politically-close and may
serve as a supervisory (monitoring) mechanism, according to the patronage
control rationale already mentioned. Additionally, strategic firms are often
used as political means to guarantee employment (hence popular support),
as these firms usually hire overcapacity, and employ thousands of employees.
In the sample, 81.61% of politically-connected firms are located in major
cities where politicians are more likely to extract political support (votes),
and almost one-third of privatized firms are politically connected. However,
the work tells us nothing about the characteristics of the appointees, such as
e.g. their political loyalty, their position within the party or their professional
background. A similar analysis would be of some interest if conducted also
towards public agencies, both national and local.
Since politicians obtain private benefits from controlling government-
owned firms (Dinc¸, 2005; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), scholars have also con-
sidered the role of political patronage in the privatization decision. For exam-
ple, politicians can influence the hiring decisions of government-owned firms
to favor supporters. Theory suggests that politicians may target govern-
ment programs to reward supporters with patronage (Cox and McCubbins,
1986; Persson and Tabellini, 2002). Hence, rent-seeking politicians may de-
lay privatization in regions where their supporters are based. In particular,
considering a firm being politically connected if a politician is elected from
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the same state where the firm is located, Dinc and Gupta (2011) show that
connected firms are never privatized. The provided argument for the reluc-
tant privatization is related to the likelihood that the politician has many
supporters in his home state, which could be rewarded through patronage
more easily in case the firm is not privatized.
In addition to privatization reforms, also decentralization policies may
grant opportunities for the enduring patronage usage. Indeed, the way in
which the reform is implemented may allow the appointment of party mem-
bers to public institutions’ and PPEs’ management, specifically at subna-
tional levels of government. In particular, the proliferation of public or semi-
public firms, providing e.g. local public services, and the slackness of re-
cruitment regulations could pave the way for the creation of patronage jobs.
As Hutchcroft (2012) suggests, largely celebrated federalist reforms, consid-
ered necessary for promoting local autonomy and accountability, have proved
to be events of persistent access of local politicians to patronage resources.
Similarly, for African countries, Makara (2018, p. 28) states that “both in
central government and local governments, political patronage interferes with
the bureaucratic order and functioning”. Then again, the concept is stressed
by Sadanandan (2012, p. 212) who firmly states that “decentralization has
empowered local politicians to engage in patronage politics”.
In the same vein, Kleibrink (2015) suggests how virtuous ideals of re-
gional self-rule, to be achieved through decentralization reforms, have been
betrayed by parties’ elites in order to advance their own interests. Politi-
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cal establishments and parties have promptly transformed public sector jobs
at the regional level into patronage opportunities. In his work, the author
shows how much the politicization of the public sector has spread in Serbia
and Croatia. He examines also the diffusion of patronage at different levels
of government and to what extent elites in the center and periphery have ac-
cess to patronage resources. The novel insight of the research is that elites in
the center are more likely to support regional autonomy and decentralization
reforms if they open up opportunities to dispense patronage to their affili-
ates and partisans in the regional bodies, therefore gaining new appointing
powers. The empirical analysis seems to disclose a systematic pattern: the
growth of public sector employment is rather pronounced at the regional level
and it is stronger after decentralization reforms were adopted. This surge in
public sector jobs would open up opportunities to fill public and semi-public
bodies with political appointees.
As already noted, decentralization is a reform process that increases the
occasions for patronage because it is often associated with increased public
sector employment, also at lower levels of government. Moreover, it could
lead to a more fragmented policy-making, with an implementation process
characterized by a larger discretion regarding the recruitment of public sector
employees (Treisman, 2007). Consequently, in the event that personnel hiring
decisions are not merit-based, as Kim and Yoon (2018) notes, even a decen-
tralized system will not be equipped with government capacity (Fukuyama,
2013; La Porta et al., 1999; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008). Policy adminis-
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trations will suffer from problems of ineffectiveness, despite the well-known
theoretical beneficial effects of federalism.
A particular strand of literature has focused also on how the regulation
of local semi-public firms has allowed the public shareholder to retain some
control over these firms management (Bortolotti et al., 2007b; Osculati). The
move towards privatization has demonstrated the increasing will to include
the private sector in the provision of local public services, in order to im-
prove the national public budgets and make local PPEs more efficient and
less oriented to political objectives. For European countries, pressures from
the Union for liberalization of local public service markets have pulled the
trigger on the corporatization process that has invested local public services
providers, with the consequence of a proliferation of disaggregated entities.
Following this trend, we should see an increasing role of the private sector
in providing local services in those sectors which have been privatized, but
this is not what we observe in reality. Full privatization or private provision
is usually rare, also at the local level. The study of the European Centre
of Employers and Enterprises providing Public services (CEEP, 2010) shows
that in the majority of European countries, municipalities organize utilities
in communal enterprises, serving the local jurisdiction; they can be the sole
property of a municipality, in co-management with various municipalities,
or in co-participation with private agents. As a result of the phenomena of
reluctant privatization and municipal capitalism, public services, especially
in Europe, are increasingly provided by PPEs. Municipal capitalism is the
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term used by Bortolotti et al. (2011) to define the diffuse phenomenon of
ownership and control of firms from Italian local government units. The
participation to the mixed firm share capital allows the local government to
retain some form of control over it, in order to protect the public interest,
given the crucial importance of utilities in providing services affecting social
welfare. Nevertheless, as national governments do, also local administrations
preserve the control of local firms, even after the above-mentioned corpora-
tization process, allowing politics to maintain the appointment authority. In
this line, also at municipal level PPEs represent an additional opportunity
for patronage practices. Scholars have not yet focused their attention on
local political appointments, even if the figures concerning local PPEs are
enormous (CEEP, 2010). The municipal level of patronage appointments
is confirmed by (Kopecky` et al., 2012) in his volume: indeed, the authors
even say that local government units represent the heartland of patronage,
since parties have most of the time the ability to reach all institutions at the
subnational level of government.
Furthermore, from the public governance scholars’ standpoint, it is worth
noting that political appointments continue to occur, in the public sector in
general, despite the New Public Management (NPM) reforms (Mu¨ller, 2006;
Osborne, 2010; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Public service reforms started
in the 1980s, as a reaction to the governments’ lack of flexibility in dealing
with the growing complexity of social problems in modern societies. NPM
focused on performance and competition by importing managerial techniques
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into public bureaucracy, while deviating the provision of a large portion of
services toward non-governmental actors and quasi-autonomous public agen-
cies (Hood, 1991; Lane, 2002). Actually, at the national level, the scopes
of NPM theorists were the simultaneous empowerment of both SOEs’ man-
agers and ministers (Aucoin, 1990). This seems to be a paradox, however,
these reforms tried to satisfy the need for a greater managers’ authority,
and aimed to clearer policies and programs set out by ministers. As Aucoin
(2012, p. 178) noted, “proponents argued that greater political control of
policy and programs in the hands of the elected government was appropri-
ate for democratic governance and that this did not undermine management
with partisan–political interference in staffing or in the work of the public
service that is meant to be impartial”.
Nevertheless, the actual propensity to strengthen political authority over
public managers resulted in a deep politicization of the public sector, which
left little room for fairness and non-partisanship. Politicization, in the case
of the present work, is intended as the replacement of merit-based logics
with political criteria in the private-public and public sector hiring decisions
(Pierre and Peters, 2004). The new rising management system which emerged
has been called by Aucoin (2012) New Public Governance (NPG). NPG arose
in the 1990s and proposed a path toward improved effectiveness and demo-
cratic quality of public policies by stressing the participation of citizens and
communities in the design and delivery of public services (Bouckaert and Pol-
litt, 2011; Osborne, 2010). Nevertheless, as governments often demonstrated
17
unwillingness to release control over policies, in some cases, public sector
reforms implied the strategy of modernizing the state and re-affirming its
leading role in facing collective problems, indirectly granting to government
parties the power to choose public managers. Labeled as the Neo-Weberian
State, this reform path offers solutions to citizens needs by occasionally re-
lying on market-based tools, focusing on enhancing quality and efficiency of
services provided by the state (Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2011).
In practical terms, political nominations are favored also by the widespread
use of fixed-term appointments and employment contracts, which ideally have
been employed to bolster responsiveness and performance of senior public
servants. Indeed, Uelese Amosa (2008, p. 613) notes that the actual conse-
quence has been that “appointment and promotion of senior civil servants to
upper ranks of the public sector is a result of their affiliation with and loyalty
to the ruling political party” (Boston, 1992). Furthermore, politicians and
connected bureaucrats may exploit procedural loopholes and hidden norms
to informally bias the selection and promotion of personnel. These include
avoiding open and transparent publications of job announcements, leaking
exam questions, taking advantage from the high significance of recommen-
dations, or requiring prospects to affiliate the ruling political party prior to
joining the civil service (Poocharoen and Brillantes, 2013).
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3 Appointing for what?
Patronage appointments survived to privatization, decentralization and
corporatization reforms. But what are the main purposes of political nomi-
nations? What are the principal motivations which led politics to retain the
appointment authority over PPEs’ managing staff and public sector work-
force in general? In particular, as the literature has suggested, the appointing
authorities for patronage are political parties, mostly, but not exclusively, the
ruling parties (Bartolini et al., 2001; Di Mascio, 2011; Kickert, 2011). Keep-
ing in mind the well-known spoil system (Bodiguel, 1983; Folke et al., 2011;
Gardner, 1987; Reid and Kurth, 1989), several different rationales common
to all kinds of political party may be mentioned.
Parties penetrate the state to acquire more resources; these
resources, which are managed by the national headquarters and
by party groups within the representative institutions, are then
selectively used to materially compensate militants and rank-and-
file.
(Ignazi, 2014).
Probably, the most intuitive reason for using patronage nominations is
provided by the work of political scientists. In particular, since party leaders
have historically retained the access to state resources in spite of the enacted
reforms, and since that intra-party dissent has regularly weakened parties
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at the polls, it is rather likely that party leaders strengthen party discipline
and reduce internal splits through patronage. Scholars have provided some
motivations for politicians to deviate from parties’ lines (Carson et al., 2010;
Heller and Mershon, 2005; Indridason, 2008) but revising them is beyond the
scope of the present work. Here, I underline how patronage represents a tool
to keep parties’ members in line, given that a high degree of party cohesion
in legislative voting always represents a beneficial feature from the party’s
standpoint. That is all the more true for government parties since losing
a vote in parliament is often regarded as a sign that the cabinet no longer
has the confidence of the legislative assembly. The argument is bolstered
by politicians’ incentives to follow their party’s dictates. Indeed, legisla-
tors would carefully consider voicing policy concerns, cross-voting or party
switching for multiple reasons. Above all, they are dependent on their party
labels for reelection and on their party for career advancements (Carey and
Shugart, 1995). Therefore, both backbenchers and parties would electorally
suffer from dissent (Crowe, 1980). However, since party cohesion in parlia-
mentary systems is high but not perfect, rewarding loyal parties’ members
with a patronage outside option (Kopecky` et al., 2012; Panebianco, 1988)
still have a raison d’eˆtre. In the words of Claveria and Verge (2015, p. 823),
“parties can reward their loyal members with positions in the higher echelons
of public administration, the governing boards of public sector companies,
advisory committees and regulatory bodies, executive positions in party foun-
dations, as well as secure them safe positions in electoral lists”. In addition,
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considering ex-ministries, Blondel (1991) notes that they could aim to cabinet
reappointments, parliamentary office, local and regional offices, but also to
political careers (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) in a public enterprise.6 A post-
parliamentary career in the public sector is an opportunity also reported by
(Chafetz, 2008, p. 703): “the types of charitable, voluntary or local commu-
nity work taken on by our former MPs (Members of Parliament) most often
involved them as board members or chairs, trustees or members of advisory
boards for these sort of organizations, often leveraging their access to and
familiarity with decision-makers in the public sector.” Naturally, patronage
may be intended as a reward also for supporters and not only for ministers or
members of parliament. In this last case, understandably, less evidence has
been provided by scholars. It is worth noting that all parties are not equally
capable of making use of this resource. Weak parties or parties that have
spent a long time out of office “lack the discipline, the trained leadership,
and the surplus of potential jobholders to use the system to their maximum
advantage” (Sorauf, 1959, p. 119). So-called entrenched parties (parties that
have been in control of a legislature for at least two years), on the other
hand, are much better at exploiting the potential of political recruitment
successfully. They have the experience, the routines, and the networks to
make political appointments to important public sector job positions.
Beyond the reward rationale, recent party research has suggested another
6Post-cabinet career and revolving door concerning private enterprises issues are beyond
the focus of the paper, however, a nomination to a PPE’s managing staff represents a
patronage-related payoff for the appointee.
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meaningful political advantage deriving from patronage nominations usage.
It is related to the role of membership for the maintenance of parties in
western democracy, a subject of an on-going debate to this day. More and
more frequently, works on party change investigate the increasing costs for
party leaders, in modern democracies, of recruiting and retaining members,
as Blyth and Katz (2005). Mair and Van Biezen (2001) document how lead-
ers try to maintain a membership basis in a moment when an observable
trend of political participation decline across western democracies over time.
The practical consequence of the trend turns out to be a large number of pas-
sive members’ shrinks and, consequently, a substantial drop of membership
fees they do not contribute anymore. Patronage, for that, may help parties
to extract funding from the state: patronage appointees are often asked to
contribute to the party budget with a certain percentage of their salaries as a
return for appointments and jobs (Katz and Mair, 1994; Sorauf, 1960; Ware,
1996). In this sense, a political nomination represents an indirect surrogate of
public financing for the party. This is also true at the highest level, whenever
members of parliament are called to devote a share of their parliamentary
income to the party, even though viewing a candidacy to the parliament as a
patronage exchange may be highly questionable. Therefore, parties seem to
be able to cope with the declining trend of political participation by acquiring
access to state funding, as stated also by Van Biezen (2000) and Van Biezen
(2004). As Panebianco (1988) suggests, at the same time, however, the num-
ber of active members shrinks as well - those members who are crucial to
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uphold the party on the ground as an organization. Indeed, especially in bad
electoral times, the existence of a core of supporters is essential to a party
survival. Gratifying activists with a patronage job, besides potentially in-
creasing the party’s probability of winning elections (Folke et al., 2011), may
preserve or even increase the number of active party members. As Pollock
(1937, p. 32) notes, “employees who are politically appointed are naturally
expected to attend political meetings, make speeches, canvass voters, and do
all the other things involved in political activity”. This primarily interests
the municipal level of the public sphere (Stokes et al., 2013).
Facing declining trend of the political participation is not only a concern
of party elites who want to maintain their own position in the party ma-
chinery, but it also regards the outside credibility of parties in being able
to deliver programs, policies and personnel in the long run. Thus, party
establishments need an organization which helps to channel, monitor and
pre-select potential successors and keeps them waiting without threatening
the current leadership. To do so, party workers are needed to uphold the
basic organizational infrastructure and motivating them to continuous work
quite naturally creates costs for the party leadership. Patronage may then
represent a useful tool to bear this cost without squandering parties mone-
tary resources. Indeed, the growing challenges for party elites to reconcile
electoral and organizational goals lead to patronage usage as a selective in-
centive that can help to cope with these challenges. Empirically, the increase
in party patronage observed in several European democracies of fairly het-
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erogeneous institutional make-up, as pointed out by Mu¨ller (2000a) and by
Blondel (2003), can be read as one symptom of these transformations of
western democracies.
Further on what already said, Ennser-Jedenastik (2014c) specifically de-
scribes what may be called the political reason in the strict sense. One of the
sub-fields of political science most comprehensively concerned with patronage
appointments regards coalition governance. This strand of literature investi-
gates the processes by which parties form governments, distribute ministerial
offices, bargain over policy output and manage the termination of cabinets
(Laver and Shepsle, 1990; Strøm et al., 2008). The common ground between
research on coalition governments and political allocation of public jobs is
the study of office pay-offs, but this line of research has largely been lim-
ited to analyzing the distribution of ministerial portfolios.7 One of the few
works regarding public firms is provided by Ennser-Jedenastik (2014c). The
author focuses the attention on a specific patron–client relationship, namely
the appointment of party loyalists to managerial boards in state-owned cor-
porations, thus centering the focus of the present review. As already noted,
the author shows that factions leaders may also use appointments to buy
support from members of parliament, thus mitigating the risk of intra-party
rebellion in the face of electoral defeat or unpopular decisions made by the
government. The distribution of nominations, when considering coalitions,
7Exceptions are Lipsmeyer and Pierce (2011), Manow and Zorn (2004), Thies (2001),
Verzichelli (2008) and Carroll and Cox (2007).
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may accordingly play the same task ensuring each governing party a fair
share of public sector position. Indeed, the main result of the article is that
the partisan composition of managerial boards reflects the partisan compo-
sition of government in a proportional manner, respecting the well-known
“Gamson’s Law” (Gamson, 1961).
Not necessarily looking to patronage nominations as detrimental prac-
tices, some scholars consider them as one of several forms of linkage between
the government and the parties that support it. Indeed, all conceptions of
party government revolve around the relationship between political parties
and the executive, as in Katz (1986) and in Mair (2008). Mu¨ller (2000b)
presents such appointments as a legitimate link in the chain of delegation
between voters, parties and the state apparatus, even though this link is
typically not regarded as strengthening the process of democratic represen-
tation or accountability. Thus, through patronage political parties establish
ties with PPEs, and the public sector in general, in order to better control
and coordinate the desired policies, also accordingly to the popular mandate.
By placing people loyal to the party in leading administrative positions, a
government attempts to facilitate the implementation of political decisions
(Lewis, 2010; Pierre and Peters, 2004). In this case the appointees control,
or influence, public sector resources by acting as the “eyes, ears and mouth”
of political parties (Connaughton, 2015, p. 39) from inside the organization.
Similarly, politicians often have the opportunity to nominate external advi-
sors who do not directly enter into the PPE’s managing staff. Also in this
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case, parties would seek experts who share their political views about policies
to be implemented (Aberbach and Rockman, 1994) and combine both party
political loyalty and technical capabilities, whenever possible. Literature has
shown that experts are typically found at the higher level of the administra-
tive hierarchy (Joignant, 2011). The above dynamics may occur also at the
local level. There are typically shared responsibilities between national and
local governments in the provision of complex and important services such as
health and education. For example, in the Italian education sector the central
government has the responsibility for hiring teachers and deciding curricula,
but school buildings are under the responsibility of provincial governments
(for high schools) and municipal governments (for primary schools). At the
same time, regional governments are responsible for vocational training and
bursaries. In this case, appointing aligned personnel in the key points of
the public or semi-public sphere seems politically fruitful for, e.g., pushing
through local budget cuts regarding local public entities when unavoidable.
Political appointments of public servants have been claimed to be one
of the most important measures available to executives who wish to control
bureaucracy and influence policies (Moe, 1985). Elected politicians have al-
ways a legitimate interest in controlling what government organizations do
and they may use patronage appointments for that, especially when doubting
the ideological loyalty of the civil service (Dickinson and Rudalevige, 2004;
Moynihan and Roberts, 2010; Pfiffner, 1985; Rouban, 2003). Therefore, an
absolute division between politics and administration is probably unrealis-
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tic (Svara, 1998), yet, a growing politicization of the public and semi-public
sphere seems to emerge. Undoubtedly, massive use of patronage appoint-
ments may jeopardize the efficient governance of mixed and public firms.
The kinds of positions politicized, their number in relation to the civil ser-
vice in general, and the background of those recruited vary between coun-
tries, but the burgeoning phenomenon is observed in most administrative
systems (Bouckaert and Pollitt, 2011). The literature focusing on this issue
is quite recent and, fortunately, largely growing (Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014a,
2015; Gherghina and Kopecky`, 2016; Holmgren, 2018).
4 The politicization of the public sector and
the consequences
The debate about political–administrative relations is related to what al-
ready said, and in essence, it is an issue of virtuous governance and efficient
management (Bello` and Spano, 2015; Dahlstro¨m and Niklasson, 2013). Given
the growth of public service provision across states, ranging from health
care, education, public utilities, agricultural and social services (Ricks, 2016;
Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Tsai, 2007), an interesting topic for scholars
regards the bureaucracies delivering these services, and the factors that en-
able an effective delivery of them. From now on I will refer to bureaucracy
having in mind every public and semi-public agency, or firm, providing public
services, potentially at risk of political patronage exploitation.
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Undoubtedly, the bureaucratic organization is of crucial importance for
the economy of a country (Evans and Rauch, 1999), since how a state con-
tributes to the economic activity largely depends on the state’s own ability to
deliver public goods and services (Lovett, 2011). In general, bureaucracies are
channels for producing a range of outputs, such as policies, regulations and
infrastructure, that can enhance an economy’s business environment. Also,
bureaucracies facilitate resources allocation through the budgetary provision
of services to both citizens (Altay, 1999) and firms, having the task of en-
suring that the resources assigned to public service provision are put to the
best available use, to facilitate both greater and high quality output in both
the public and private sectors (Altay, 1999).
Due to the nature of their job, bureaucrats and public servants must make
decisions on the spot and exercise discretion in identifying the beneficiaries
of services and resources, choosing the method by which services are dis-
tributed, and deciding how and when to enforce government policies (Lipksy,
1980). The discretion of the civil servants in decision making allows them
to become de facto policymakers. In controlling the adoption of policies,
especially front-line providers directly influence the quality of life for many
citizens (Lipksy, 1980). All things considered, one of the crucial points here
is represented by the bureaucrats’ desire for autonomy that faces a perma-
nent war with the politicians ambition for surveillance and control (Pepinsky
et al., 2017). In this regard, some authors show how controlling bureaucra-
cies trough patronage appointments may divert important resources away
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from public goods and services delivery (Hicken, 2011; Keefer, 2007). When
politicians exchange jobs with partisans, then these jobs may be inessential
to the running of the state or even harmful. Therefore, whether civil servants
are hired by merit or through partisan criteria has strong implications for
state capacity (Geddes, 1994; Grzymala-Busse, 2007; O’Dwyer, 2006).
The massive usage of political appointments ends up in the so-called
politicization of the bureaucracy. Politicization has been treated in various
ways by scholars. According to Rouban (2007), the concept has been mainly
viewed in three manners: as the political participation of civil servants in
the political decision-making of governments, as their political involvement,
and as the partisan control over the bureaucracy. The third connotation,
the most traditional and the one used for this review, conceives politiciza-
tion as “. . . the substitution of political criteria for merit-based criteria
in the selection, retention, promotion, rewards, and disciplining of members
of the public service” (Pierre and Peters, 2004, p. 2).8 Undoubtedly, poli-
tics may affect bureaucracy’s behavior differently from patronage. Political
authorities can informally influence bureaucratic decisions on the core tasks
of the organizations through pressuring officials, ignoring the technical ad-
vice by staff, and even manipulating the information they produce. Some
American cases reveal this kind of practices, for instance, at the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Food
8Similarly, (Kopecky` and Scherlis, 2008, p. 356) define patronage as “the power of a
party to appoint people to positions in public and semi-public life”.
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and Drug Administration, and NASA (see Gilboy (1992); Moynihan and
Roberts (2010)). Bello` and Spano (2015) find that Italian public managers
perceive a political influence on the decision-making process, the setting of
action plans, and the existing rewards/promotions policies. Managers also
believe that politicians influence what objectives must be given priority, thus
undermining considerations of the outputs of the decision-making process.
As noted above, despite the multitude of reforms fostered by governments
to keep politics out, political patronage ties continue to jeopardize the abil-
ity of administrations to effectively govern and manage themselves (Grindle,
2012; Pierre and Peters, 2004). Nevertheless, some scholars continue to focus
on the dilemma about how political authorities can exert a legitimate con-
trol while ensuring that the bureaucracy preserves its capacity, professional
values, and performance standards to serve the citizenry (Svara, 1998). In
highly politicized bureaucracies, such as in the United States and several
Latin American countries, there is a tendency to staff senior civil service
positions with political appointments that rely on patronage-driven criteria
(Grindle, 2012; Matheson et al., 2007). These designations generally coexist
with other mechanisms, which ultimately integrate merit and political loyalty.
Indeed, work on party patronage has shown that it is common for political
leaders to prefer appointees who combine professional qualifications and po-
litical loyalty (Kopecky` et al., 2016). Further to the previous point, there
is a strand of literature which suggests that political appointees are even
important and can be relied on to improve government performance. For
30
example, the administrative presidency approach, first advanced by Nathan
(1983), is a strategy to promote the political and policy agendas of the exec-
utive by circumventing career bureaucrats. Nathan introduced the concept
to describe president Nixons and Reagans efforts to weaken seemingly au-
tonomous civil service in order to control spending and other actions of the
bureaucracy; clearly enough, administrative presidency assumes a sentiment
of antipathy between the President and the bureaucracy. The administrative
presidency model holds that people appointed by the president will be loyal to
his agenda; this, in turn, promotes political responsiveness to the extent that
voters elected a president with a specific platform that reflects that agenda.
The model further assumes that career bureaucrats cannot be trusted and
are not loyal enough to promote the presidents policies (Aberbach et al.,
1981; Resh, 2015).
Jiang (2018) advances an alternative view on the role of patron-client
networks in public organizations. Viewing them beneficial, he argues that
patronage appointments can help to improve the performance of bureaucra-
cies. More specifically, he claims that the capacity of patron-client relations
to coordinate actions in the absence of formal, third-party enforcement en-
ables them to offer an important solution to the principal-agent problem that
frequently occurs within the public service. By fostering mutual trust and
raising the value of long-term cooperation, these relations help to align the in-
terests between government agents and their principals and discourage short-
term, opportunistic behaviors. When formal incentive schemes are weak or
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incomplete, these personal ties can serve as an alternative mechanism for
principals to mobilize agents to accomplish important governing tasks. This
perspective echoes a growing, but still scattered, literature claiming that cer-
tain informal or traditionalistic practices can serve as second-best arrange-
ments for stimulating growth in weakly institutionalized settings. Schneider
(1992), for example, argues that the dense patronage networks in the Brazil-
ian bureaucracy contributed to the countrys rapid industrial development in
the 1970s and 1980s by facilitating coordination among different agencies.
In another important work, Jia et al. (2015) argue that patronage ties
may facilitate meritocratic selection by giving senior leaders greater confi-
dence in the loyalty of their subordinates, and they show that there exists a
complementary relationship between political connection and performance in
predicting provincial-level agencies’ promotions. While the existing political
science research on patronage networks has focused mainly on their negative
consequences, such as corruption (Rose-Ackerman and Palifka, 2016) and
vote buying (Stokes, 2005), they claim that these networks can also be used
to advance more public-spirited goals. Both the early literature on organi-
zation theory and the more recent one on relational contracts, for example,
have held a largely neutral view on the role of informal groups, seeing them as
a useful mechanism to sustain compliance and effectiveness in hierarchically
structured organizations (Baker et al., 2002; Barnard, 1968).
Few studies underline the beneficial effects of some degree of politicization
on performance within developed western democracies. The classic work by
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Aberbach and Rockman (1994) begins describing the different roles presumed
to exist between political appointees (short lived agents) and careerists (long
lived agents) (Spiller and Urbiztondo, 1994). Early on, political appointees
were thought to make policies, while career bureaucrats would implement
them. Today, both are seen as policy makers and implementers. The au-
thors find that political executives see themselves more as advocates for
broader causes while career bureaucrats tend to mediate organized interests
within the realm of their administrative mandates. Bureaucrats, they say,
exhibit such characteristics as competence, fairness, and prudence, whereas
the appointees convey greater passion and conviction. The point here is that
research stresses not only the trade-offs between values of political respon-
siveness and technical expertise but also their complementarity. As Maranto
(2005) points out, political appointees and career bureaucrats can and do
cooperate with each other to perform the work of government, and they are
bound by their common desire to make the difference (Maranto, 2005, p.
12). Thus, the association between careerist and political appointees may be
particularly fruitful. As Maranto (2005, p. 16) goes on to say, because of the
tenure of careerists, “savvy political executives will generally seek to work
with rather than against career executives”.
However, many empirical and theoretical studies show that countries in
which the recruitment of civil servants is based mainly on merit instead
of political affiliation perform better in the sense that they have more ef-
fective bureaucracies, higher economic growth (Evans and Rauch, 1999),
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more universal welfare systems (Rothstein et al., 2012), and are less prone
to corruption (Dahlstro¨m et al., 2012; Rauch and Evans, 2000). Focusing
on bureaucracies’ human resources efficacy, Perry and Miller (1991) found
a positive impact of personnel actions that protect employees from political
interventions; such practices also positively affect agency performance and
public trust of the bureaucracy. Even more recent research has estimated
differences in organizational performance depending on the mechanism for
staffing public managers, showing that agencies headed by career managers
achieve systematically higher performance ratings than those managed by
political appointees (Gilmour and Lewis, 2006; Hollibaugh Jr, 2014; Lewis,
2007, 2010). Lewis (2010) used data from the Federal Human Capital Survey,
and he found that agencies managed by career managers were perceived by
employees as better led and managed than those run by political appointees.
They were also considered better places to work.
The negative effect of politicization on performance might be even more
pronounced when it is possible to determine the motivations behind polit-
ical appointments. Gallo and Lewis (2011) distinguished patronage-driven
from other types of appointments, with the former mainly based on previous
work on campaigns or party affiliation. The authors confirmed the perfor-
mance gap between organizations managed by careerists and by appointees.
Agencies run by patronage-driven managers achieved lower performance than
those led by other appointees, and even lower performance than organiza-
tions managed by career managers (Miller, 2014). Donahue et al. (2000)
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show that cities with more politicized patronage-driven administrative bod-
ies tend to have lower human resource management effectiveness. A possible
explanation for this result is that “political machines have not traditionally
been concerned with skills assessment, merit-based hiring, and other strategic
activities (ibidem, p. 402).
A direct effect is grounded in the differences between the background of
political appointees and career managers, which produces the performance
gap in the agencies they led (Gallo and Lewis, 2011; Lewis, 2007, 2010).
While appointees tend to have higher levels of education as well as more ex-
perience working in political positions, business, and/or nonprofits, careerists
have backgrounds that seem more relevant for bureaucratic performance: a
previous public management experience. Such expertise might be acquired by
working in various agencies or even in the same agency that they might even-
tually manage, which makes them specialists in their respective professional
areas. In addition, political appointees tend to have different behaviors than
career managers, because they must maintain their political loyalty and the
ideological commitment that brought them to their positions (Grindle, 2012).
A serious problem clearly emerges when compromises influence appointees
decision making to such a degree that their objectivity and rationality are un-
dermined (Moynihan and Roberts, 2010). Neshkova and Kostadinova (2012)
argue that the absence of political criteria in recruitment shelters adminis-
trative decisions from political rent-seeking and makes civil servants better
able to withstand political pressure since their career is not on the line to the
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same extent and since they do not owe their appointments to political supe-
riors. Moreover, once a political appointee takes a position, it is likely that
other appointments will follow. Indeed, patronage operates as a pyramidal
system that grows vertically and horizontally, in which superiors (patrons)
appoint one or more subordinates to jobs via political or personal loyalty
(Bearfield, 2009; Grindle, 2012). Thus, most of the agencies relevant jobs be-
come destined for other political appointees (Lewis, 2010), and this ensures
an alteration of hiring practices that sometimes affects most probably the
performance of the governance.
The deterioration of merit principles caused by politicization affects not
only the recruitment and selection processes but also other human resources
management practices, in particular, performance appraisals. Indeed, one of
the problems about politicization is also how to deal with the subjectivity
that appraisals entail, and how partisanship ultimately affects the fairness,
validity, and effectiveness of assessments. In effect, the predominance of po-
litical appointees supervising positions might jeopardize the acceptance of
performance appraisals by employees and, consequently, the perceived effec-
tiveness of this practice, as they may question its fairness and its driving
criteria (Kim and Holzer, 2016). In addition, the high turnover of appointed
managers in politicized agencies limits the effectiveness of performance ap-
praisals because they do not have much time at their agencies, so they do
not know their subordinates well enough to judge their performance (Naff
and Riccucci, 2012). This turnover negatively affects the construction of
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trustworthy relationships, which is also essential for employees to accept the
legitimacy of performance appraisal systems and outcomes. Besides resign-
ing from politicized organizations plagued by unfairness, instability, and low
morale, employees may also become apathetic. In fact, indifference may be
more likely than turnover due to employees job security and tenure, which
act as strong inhibitors (Vigoda, 2000). As a result, employees may trivialize
training and professional development opportunities at agencies, as they re-
alize that getting more expertise will not be rewarded (Lewis, 2010). Indeed,
training policies are much more effective in those agencies where personnel
might incorporate what they learn and where merit-based promotions pre-
dominate (Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995).
The quality of public bureaucracy is widely regarded also as a fundamen-
tal determinant of corruption (Cardona, 1999; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000).
Recent contributions stress the merits of the classic Weberian model of bu-
reaucracy, in particular the positive impact of merit recruitment on lowering
corruption (Dahlstro¨m et al., 2012; Rauch and Evans, 2000). By contrast, the
role of other features of Weberian bureaucracies such as separate employment
laws, formal examination systems, and permanent tenure remain contested.
Moreover, studies of the impact of public sector wage levels have led to con-
tradictory results (Dahlstro¨m et al., 2012; So¨o¨t and Rootalu, 2012; Treisman,
2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Early studies have typically been
based on cross-country analyses that are primarily reliant on countrywide
expert assessments of corruption and bureaucratic quality. It is worth not-
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ing that these measures are often criticized. In particular, for their reliance
on the perception of external observers, mostly international business elites;
for the difficulty of comparing measurements across countries and time; for
the politicization of governance indicators suggested by policy-makers and
media (Andersson and Heywood, 2009; Olken, 2009; Rose and Mishler, 2010;
Thomas, 2010).
Dahlstro¨m et al. (2012) extend this line of research carrying it to 52 coun-
tries from the developed and developing world. They rely on an expert survey
to distinguish the features of Weberian bureaucracies. Their empirical analy-
sis finds that more professional bureaucracies that rely on merit recruitment,
internal promotion, and de-politicization of careers feature less corruption.
When distinguishing among the components of a professional bureaucracy,
they find that merit recruitment is the main corruption-containing factor
(Charron et al., 2017; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018). In addition, Rauch and
Evans (2000) suggest that merit recruitment fosters an ethos of professional-
ism in the civil service. Formal examination procedures and merit standards
lead to the selection of relatively more competent and honest officials who
are subsequently socialized into professional norms that contradict corrupt
behavior.
Therefore, political appointments have been argued to increase corruption
risks in public administration (Heywood and Meyer-Sahling, 2013). At the
individual level, they create personal dependencies between politicians and
appointees. Political appointees have the incentive to collude with politi-
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cians rather than act as a check if the latter engage in corrupt practices.
In addition, political appointees, hired via fixed-term contracts, owe their
position to a politician or party and face a greater risk of losing their job
after politicians are voted out of office. Inevitably, political appointees have
a shorter time horizon and therefore are more prone to keeping an eye on
future employment and income opportunities outside public administration.
This could give them incentives to collude in corrupt deals with private sector
firms.
More recently, Meyer-Sahling and Mikkelsen (2016) provide evidence based
on individual-level data from a survey of public servants in five Eastern Eu-
ropean countries. They show that merit recruitment is associated with less
corruption, while politicization is associated with more corruption. This find-
ing is supported by Heywood and Meyer-Sahling (2013) qualitative analysis
of the Polish ministerial bureaucracy and by Bersch et al. (2017) for Brazilian
agencies. Oliveros and Schuster (2018) conduct a conjoint experiment in the
Dominican Republic, finding, to my knowledge, the first (survey) experimen-
tal support for the argument that merit recruitment limits corruption.
5 Conclusions
Nowadays the state retains an important role in several (strategic) sec-
tors of the economy, even in countries organized according to the principles
of free market and private property. Indeed, in recent years governments,
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partially divesting SOEs, have transformed the well-known model of state
capitalism, under which they owned and managed wholly owned SOEs, into
a new model in which governments at all levels work hand in hand with
private investors. Beyond having rights to public agencies, governments pre-
served their role as minority or majority shareholders in a variety of firms
across multiple industries, often retaining a controlling stake. As a result,
(government) parties maintained their appointment authority over newly pri-
vatized firms and public agencies, most often nominating loyal co-partisans
to these entities’ management. Moreover, patronage has proved to be one of
the reasons why privatizations and corporatizations have been partially and
poorly implemented. This has allowed the endurance of what Pasquino, for
the Italian case, called the deep state colonization made by political parties.
Political appointments are primarily made to control public institutions:
parties nominate loyal individuals to top strategic positions (senior execu-
tives, board members, public managers) in order to render administrative
structures and public firms more responsive to changes in policy priorities.
Nevertheless, party leaders may also be tempted to use patronage job po-
sitions in exchange for party members’ loyalty, thus mitigating the risk of
intra-party rebellion in the face of electoral defeat or unpopular decisions
made by the party. Further, considering the recent growing professionaliza-
tion of politics, patronage has also been used for funding political parties and
preserving political participation. In my view, it would be compelling to em-
pirically investigate patronage as an instrument to assure intra-organizational
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loyalty or to influence party elites’ electoral strategies. Indeed, while party
elites resort to patronage, along with their increasing dependency on state
funding, has been identified as one indication of party change, its interplay
with party elites electoral strategies have not been spelled out systematically.
While empirical work on patronage shows that it is used to compensate party
activists, it would be of some interest going one step forward and studying
the strategical implications of the patronage usage in the political selection
process. Beyond that, there are very few studies outside the U.S. that look
into, e.g., the relationship between the ideological bias of the government and
the level of patronage and politicization. The work of Dahlstro¨m and Niklas-
son (2013) represents one of the few exceptions. Analyzing the Swedish case
the authors show that, contrary to what expected, the leftright affiliation of
the government, the number of years they have been in power, and the par-
liamentary strength of the government parties do not display any convincing
effects on politically-connected recruitment. They, therefore, conclude that
the knowledge of which socio-political characteristics may favor the politi-
cization of public administration is actually very limited.
Not necessarily conceiving patronage appointments as a detrimental prac-
tice, debates on the need for political control and the right balance of political
appointees vs. a-political civil servants have been broadly made. Recent re-
search on party patronage has argued that control is a necessary element of
party government and can contribute to more efficient policy-making. Empir-
ical research about the positive returns of politically appointed bureaucrats,
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or directors of semi-public firms’ boards, seem to be scant to this day. There-
fore it would be stimulating to quantify the above “right balance” between
appointees and careerists. In addition, further research must be encour-
aged to understand whether, e.g., politicians select competent professionals
so that no efficiency issues arise from patronage appointments, beyond the
value judgment about the selection criterion.
In spite of this, most scholars today agree that an administration uniquely
run by political appointees is likely to have a severe negative impact on the
competence, efficiency, legitimacy and corruption of the public administra-
tion. This particularly applies in the case when political criteria take prece-
dence over merit criteria in public sector appointments. Indeed, the existing
research on patronage networks holds a generally negative view about their
impact on government performance. Studies from various political settings
have argued that these private networks tend to undermine a governments
ability to fulfill its public functions by distorting incentives and weakening
agents’ performance. The negative assessment of the effect of political pa-
tronage also figures prominently in comparative analyses of states successes
and failures in promoting development, especially as an explanation for the
poor economic performance of many developing countries (Goldsmith, 1999).
The persistence of politicization and the major threat it seems to pose to pub-
lic sector governance and performance reinforce the need for further inquiry.
Important contributions have theoretically examined politicization, whereas
only some have empirically tested its consequences, especially its deleterious
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impact on organizational performance. Despite the remarkable value of these
findings, the reasons behind the negative effects of the politicization of the
civil service remain quite elusive. Moreover, the impact of politicization on
performance has been mostly studied in the United States. Designing and im-
plementing reforms to effectively control politicization requires deeper insight
into the different areas where public agencies are affected by politicization,
and how it affects performance.
In addition, patronage and politicization are regarded as detrimental
practices which boost corruption, contrary to professionalization procedures.
One prominent characteristic of professionalization is naturally represented
by the adoption of merit laws in staff recruitment. Such laws typically re-
quire selection for the appointment to the civil service to be on merit and on
the basis of fair and open competition. In practice, fair and open competi-
tion requires advertised vacancies and the selection of the best applicants in
competitive written and/or oral examinations. Nevertheless, scholars have
posited that the adoption of civil service laws does not necessarily lead to
the de-politicization of civil services. Patronage is often permitted by law
through loopholes such as temporary contracts or parallel institutions. Alter-
natively, incumbents may manipulate seemingly meritocratic examinations
to favor preferred candidates. Also, executives may ignore merit laws: the
absence of rule-of-law contexts, or weak law enforcement, is characteristic
of patronage states. In the event that public servants, including those in
charge of legal compliance, are appointed based on political and personal cri-
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teria, then their decision-making typically prioritizes political-personal over
professional-legal criteria. Legal violations of merit laws thus tend to go
unpunished. Thus, further research would fruitfully investigate which condi-
tions could rule out the just mentioned dynamics.
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